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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this mater pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(h), as an appeal from a final Order entered in the 
underlying civil proceeding. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard for review of whether the Judge Iwasaki properly modified Mr. 
Catten's alimony obligation from $900.00 per month to $600.00 per month is that the 
trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony so long as it considered the 
relevant factors regarding awards of alimony, and if the trial court did consider all the 
relevant factors and made sufficient findings as to those factors, its discretion will not 
be disturbed. See Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The factors set forth by statute that the court is to consider regarding an award 
of alimony are set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 (7) and include, (i) the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient, (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
provide income, and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Additionally 
the Court is to consider the standard of living existing at the time of separation in 
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determining the amount of alimony. Under Section 30-3-5(7)(d), the Court may attempt 
to equalize the parties standard of living. As long as the Court considers the three 
factors cited above, it may consider other factors and the Court of Appeals should only 
disturb the trial court's ruling upon a showing that such serious inequity has resulted as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). 
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 (7)(g)(i) the trial court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders based upon 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
In making such a determination, the trial court is guided by the same standards for 
setting the award of alimony as in setting the initial award. See. 
As to factual findings in this case, they shall not be overturned unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. W. Fiberglass v. 
Kirton. McConkie etc., 789 P.2d 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Catten's challenge to Judge Iwasaki's decision to reduce alimony to $600 
per month must be rejected unless he marshals all the evidence to demonstrate that all 
the evidence supporting the court's award, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mrs. Catten, is insufficient to support the award. A failure to marshal the evidence and 
show the trial court's decision is so lacking as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence in a manner which results in a clear abuse of discretion, will result in the 
appeal being denied. See Walton v, Walton. 814 P.2d 619 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In fact, in a recent case, the 
4 
Court of Appeals has stated that it is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court except in the extraordinary circumstance of a manifest injustice. Reese v. Reese, 
984 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(7) applies but is not absolutely 
determinative of the issues of this case. Many cases in Utah law have addressed this 
issue of the setting and modification of alimony. Those cases are generally described 
above in the Standard for Review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Catten appeals from Judge Iwasaki's ruling modifying his alimony obligation 
from $900.00 per month to $600.00 per month. This is the only issue on appeal. Mr. 
Catten sought to have Judge Iwasaki eliminate in total his alimony obligation based 
upon his claim that Mrs. Catten has no need for alimony and so has appealed the 
decision due to the Court's decision not to eliminate in full his obligation. 
Judge Iwasaki found there was a substantial change in the material 
circumstances regarding Mr. Catten's employment circumstances, and as such made 
findings permitting him to change the alimony award. Mrs. Catten does not challenge 
that finding or that portion of the ruling. Therefore the Court had the authority to 
reconsider the amount of the alimony award in the case. This appeal is therefore 
concerned solely with whether Judge Iwasaki properly considered the alimony criteria 
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and made adequate findings to support the modification he made. 
Since this an appeal of a modification of a prior award, the propriety of the initial 
award of alimony, the amount and circumstances may not be challenged. However 
contrary to the claim of Appellant, evidence was taken in this proceeding that gave the 
Court a factual context for the key elements of its decision. Those elements set forth 
below in the Statement of Facts. 
The appellant's brief improperly attempts to quote Commissioner Bradford and 
Judge Iwasaki and to give weight to their non-evidentiary statements, even though their 
statements were not recorded and were part of pre-trial settlement discussions. Rather 
than similarly mislead the court and suggest that she is quoting Commissioner Bradford 
and Judge Iwasaki without the benefit of a transcript, Mrs. Catten respectfully requests 
that the Court strike and ignore the allegations made in Appellant's brief in numbered 
paragraphs 3 and 4 on the bottom of pages 6 and 7 of his brief (Appellant did not 
number the pages of his brief, but Appellee is counting forward from the first page of 
Appellant's brief after the cover page). 
This entire appeal is based upon the fact that Mr. Catten cannot accept that his 
ex-wife has taken the money he paid in alimony and saved it for retirement. In Mr. 
Catten's mind and arguments, that Mrs. Catten uses the alimony he pays to save for 
retirement means she did not need the alimony and does need any more alimony in the 
future, despite the fact that she is now 60 years old and she had no retirement prior to 
the divorce at the end of a 30 year marriage. 
Mr. Catten argues that because Mrs. Catten lived frugally, waiting to receive the 
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alimony from him before committing to spend it, means she did not need the alimony. 
In hindsight, she had no other economically responsible option. Mrs. Catten testified 
she could not afford to rent an apartment or make a house payment since their divorce 
in 1993 due to Mr. Catten's sporadic alimony payment history. When Mr. Catten finally 
was taken to court to force him to pay the alimony he owed, and then he did pay, Mrs. 
Catten put the money into retirement accounts. (Tr at 57, 58). 
Mrs. Catten had to leave the marital residence shortly after the divorce because 
it was sold to pay tax liabilities incurred by Mr. Catten. As an accountant, Mr. Catten 
had not filed his tax returns for 12 years and had incurred substantial tax liabilities. 
When the parties were divorced, Mrs. Catten went from living in a family home, to 
having to live in a small two bedroom, one bathroom house with her parents because 
she had no earning skills, no money to buy a home, and Mr. Catten only paid alimony 
sporadically. (Tr at 73). To the contrary, Mr. Catten lives in a fully finished and 
furnished 5 bedroom home, with substantial equity in the home, with his new wife. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to those findings made by the Court (R. At 275-278) where the 
income and expenses of each of the parties is discussed, additional material facts to 
the Court's decision regarding this appeal are as follows: 
1. Mr. Catten denied that his age was any factor in his request for an elimination 
of alimony. (Tr at 22) 
2. Mr. Catten knew Mrs. Catten had to move out of the family residence and 
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have it sold, shortly after the divorce, as a result of the tax liens on the home. (Tr at 
27-28). 
3. Mr. Catten knew Mrs. Catten had no retirement available to her at the time of 
the divorce. (Trat27). 
4. Within 6 months after the divorce, in November of 1993, Mr. Catten had 
remarried and began living again in a comfortable residence. That residence was sold, 
another purchased and now he lives in a 5 bedroom residence, with a fully furnished 
basement, with substantial equity in it. (Tr at 34-36). 
5. The home Mr. Catten lives in has plenty of room for grandchildren to visit in 
and stay in. (Tr at 36-37). 
6. Mr. Catten has been able to travel extensively since the divorce. (Tr at 38-
39). 
7. Mr. Catten has fully furnished his home (Tr at 40-41). 
8. Mr. Catten gets a substantial income tax deduction (on his 1998 tax return in 
the amount of $8670) as the result of the interest he pays for a home mortgage. (Tr at 
41). 
9. Mr. Catten only pays $765 for his home mortgage. (Exhibit 1 to Appellant's 
brief, trial exhibit D-1). This means he pays $9189 each year for his first mortgage, and 
get to deduct all but $519 of that payment. This is what it costs him each year to live in 
a fully furnished, 5 bedroom house where his grandchildren can come. 
10. Mrs. Catten has 8 grandchildren, and has no place for them to stay when 
they come to visit her. (Tr at 57, 66). 
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11. Mr. Catten only paid his court ordered alimony sporadically. (R. At 132-135, 
147-150). See also a copy of Exhibit P-6 attached hereto as Appendix 1. 
12. As a result of Mr. Catten's sporadic alimony payments since the divorce in 
1993, Mrs. Catten did not dare commit to purchasing a house or renting an apartment 
since the divorce and so has been forced to live with her parents in their small two 
bedroom, one bathroom home. (Tr at 57, Trial exh. P-6). 
13. Mrs. Catten has no education or training that has prepared her to earn more 
than her current level of earnings (Tr at 58-60). 
14. Mrs. Catten never had any earnings of substance during the marriage (Tr at 
59). 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Catten's position is simple no matter how he states it. He believes that Mrs. 
Catten does not need any alimony because the alimony he pays her gets invested in 
retirement accounts. In fact the exact quote from Mr. Catten is"... investing in 
retirement and IRA accounts and indiscriminate gifts are not actual living expenses [for] 
which alimony must be paid to avoid becoming a public charge." No legal support was 
provided for that claim. But it is true the contrary position is stated in Utah law. See 
Cox, supra. 
In the first instance, Mr. Catten's brief represents a total failure to marshal the 
evidence as required in an appeal. Mr. Catten's entire Statement of Facts and 
Argument Sections state only the Appellant's position and facts construed as Appellant 
wants them construed, with no attempt to show how they could or should be viewed in 
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the light most favoring the court's decision. A failure to marshal the evidence results in 
the denial of an appeal. 
Mr. Catten's argues that the trial court should have made at least a pro rata 
reduction in the amount of alimony to the income he was earning at the time of the 
divorce (70% by his calculation). There is no law for this position so it has no merit. 
Mr. Catten argued that his expenses were $4415 per month, which were shared 
equally with his new wife. See Exhibit 1 to Appellant's brief. Yet he failed to point out 
in his argument how his annual tax deduction for home mortgage interest has the effect 
of reducing his actual living expenses by the value of the deduction to a net payment 
for living in his five bedroom, fully furnished home to about a third of the cost. That 
deduction reduces his monthly living expenses to about $3900 per month, to be jointly 
shared with his wife. The trial court could clearly consider this reduction in his 
expenses when determining his ability to pay. A similar reduction in expense can be 
attributed to his second mortgage of $405 per month. 
The arguments that Mrs. Catten's expenses could be lowered were considered 
by the Court and it did not do so. Even if the failure to reduce her expenses is a 
legitimate issue, the amount of reduction would not be material and the Court clearly 
found Mrs. Catten has shown herself to be careful with her money. The fact that the 
Trial Court considered Mrs. Catten's income and expenses shows her need for alimony 
and ability to provide for herself was explicitly considered by the court. The same 
consideration of Mr. Catten's income and expenses occurred. Once that had occurred, 
the trial court could consider other factors as well. 
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The claim by Mrs. Catten that she did not dare rent an apartment or get into a 
house due to the sporadic nature of Mr. Catten's alimony payments is neither illogical 
or anticipatory, as argued by him. In fact he did fail to make regular alimony payments 
in large amounts, and the argument is only illogical if you reject frugality and fiscal 
responsibility as qualities the court should encourage. Mrs. Catten did not get into a 
house she could not pay for, or an apartment she would have had to leave. Instead, 
Mrs. Catten waited until she got alimony to commit it to a use, in the waiting period she 
lived frugally and saved the alimony for her retirement once she received it. 
Mrs. Catten is 60 years old. She only has a few more productive earning years 
at her level of income. To reject her frugality is to say if she had been in a house or 
apartment with a payment of $500-800 per month, and either lost the house or had to 
leave the apartment due to Mr. Catten's failure to make his alimony payments in a 
timely manner, according to Mr. Catten that might show she needed the alimony. 
Where Mrs. Catten sacrificed to live in cramped living conditions, with her parents after 
spending her entire adult life away from them, where she cannot have her 
grandchildren stay, is according to Mr. Catten reason to say she has no need for 
continued alimony. Mr. Catten seeks to benefit from his failure to make his regular 
alimony payments by saying Mrs. Catten did not need the money because she placed 
the money towards her coming retirement. To permit him to do so would be improper. 
In fact Judge Iwasaki recognized this in his findings. (TR at 73). 
Judge Iwasaki stated that one of the purposes of alimony is to avoid having 
people become wards of the state. In fact this is a stated purpose of alimony. See 
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Cox, supra. Judge Iwasaki found that Mrs. Catten's frugality is something that was 
required of her under the circumstances of this divorce and Mr. Catten's failure to make 
his regular alimony payments. 
Judge Iwasaki also recognized the inequity of Mr. Catten being in a 5 bedroom, 
fully furnished home, as the result of the contributions of a new spouse (something the 
court can consider by statute), while Mrs. Catten had to leave the family home after the 
divorce and stay in a cramped, small home with her parents where even her 
grandchildren cannot stay overnight. This inequity is another reason why the court did 
not eliminate the alimony award or reduce it dollar for dollar as suggested by Mr. 
Catten. 
The Trial Court clearly considered the three factors of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-3-5(7) regarding the needs of the recipient, the ability of recipient to provide 
for herself, and the ability of the payor to pay. All that evidence came in by way of 
exhibits of tax returns and lists of expenses by both parties. Once the court had 
considered that evidence and made findings as it did, it is free to consider other factors. 
The Court did consider other factors such as the standard of living during the marriage 
when Mrs. Catten lived in a family home that she was forced to move from, that she has 
a limited earning future, that she had no retirement for herself, that Mr. Catten had only 
made sporadic alimony payments, that Mr. Catten had a new spouse with assets which 
permit him to live in a five bedroom, fully furnished home with room for his 
grandchildren to visit and stay, while Mrs. Catten has no such asset or opportunity. 
Judge Iwasaki considered the relevant factors regarding an award of alimony, as 
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well as the additional factors he may consider by law. According to the cases on this 
subject, he has wide discretion once he has considered the principal factors of need, 
ability to provide for herself and ability of Mr. Catten to pay. Judge Iwasaki's discretion 
can only be set aside if he has been shown to have made a decision that is so void of 
support or so wrong as to be clearly erroneous. That has not occurred in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Catten received a reduction in his alimony obligation. He has never yet paid 
his obligation on time or in full without Mrs. Catten having to file legal proceedings to 
collect. At the time of the trial in December of 2000, Mr. Catten had not paid one penny 
of alimony since before October of 1998. Divorce courts are courts of equity. Based 
on equity alone, Mr. Catten's unclean hands should require a dismissal of his appeal. 
By not paying his alimony with any semblance of regularity, Mr. Catten placed 
Mrs. Catten in a position of either being fiscally foolish by relying on payments that 
would not be forthcoming, or being fiscally prudent and frugal by not spending the 
money until she got it. Once Mrs. Catten received her alimony, rather than spending it 
on jewelry, travel or even rent, she saved for her retirement. How unnecessary (or at 
least that is what Mr. Catten would have the court accept) unless one of the stated 
purposes of alimony really is to avoid having divorcing parties become wards of the 
state. 
The court made adequate findings as to Mrs. Cattens income, her expenses, her 
ability to provide for herself and Mr. Catten's ability to pay alimony. Those findings are 
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supported by the evidence and the Appellant has not even begun to marshal the 
evidence as he is required to do to support his appeal. 
Mr. Catten has shown he can pay alimony. The amount of alimony ordered by 
the court is not unsupportable by the evidence so in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion, which has not been in any proven by Mr. Catten, the order of Judge Iwasaki 
should not be disturbed. 
DATED this ! l ^ day of April, 2002. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
A/' 
Richard N. Bigelow 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the i± day of April, 2002 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, first class postage prepaid 
to the following: 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Appellant 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Tel. #801-561-4400 
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